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COMMENT
By EARLE W. CLIFFORD*

p

ROFESSOR Monypenny's discussion of "The Student as a Student" is indeed thought provoking. Accordingly, as commentary on that discussion, I wish to consider an alternative status of
the student - the student as a colleague - as a further insight into
the total complex of the student-institutional relationship.
Two prefatory comments seem to be in order as an introduction
to what follows. First, Dean Robert Yegge proposed during our
previous discussion that graduate programs designed to prepare
student personnel administrators should involve a curricular experience with the law. Without rejecting that thesis completely, my
response is that student personnel administrators ought to be better
prepared as educators, and hopefully there would be no necessity of
their becoming trained in law. The second comment is something
of an alert. It is likely that when I am finished with these remarks
I will have established a position somewhere between a romantic
idealist and a militant dean. This, of course, assumes that such a
stance is possible. Let me turn now to my assignment.
The focus of this reaction to Dr. Phillip Monypenny's paper
will be on the not-so-hidden, but unfinished agenda of this conference - at least as I see it. For me, these sessions have been unique
in this regard. Seldom have I participated in a meeting where the
hidden agenda kept surfacing so regularly and still failed consistently
to claim center stage. To me, that agenda - the hidden one - involves the nonlegal issues and items that have been identified with
reference to student-institutional relationships, rather than the legal
aspects of those relationships. Perhaps the classic example of my
point is that Terry Lunsford was introduced at the luncheon yesterday with an indication that his topic - "Who Belongs to the
University Community?" - did not quite fit elsewhere into our
program. It seems to me that the lively discussion which followed
his presentation documents that these are the central issues. By the
end of the afternoon, however, we had managed to survive the
threat of too much uncomfortable attention to such concerns.
The papers presented and the panelists' responses are replete
with references which suggest that our central focus should be on
the student-institutional relationship independent of its legal aspects,
as the best prescription for minimizing involvement with the courts.
*University Dean of Student Affairs, Rutgers University; A.B. 1950, M.S. 1951, D.S.S.
candidate, Syracuse University.
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Parenthetically, I take that as a quite proper objective. Let me share
with you very briefly the references which document my point.
(1) Professor Beaney suggested that attention to the nature and function of the university was the intelligent approach,
"justifying [the courts taking] an essentially 'hands-off' policy
toward institutions of higher learning ....1
(2) Edward Schwartz talked, too, about the nature and
function of the university and the relationship of the student to
' 2
it as "the conference that must be held.
(3) Dean McKay discussed the nature of the university
and its purposes as "a central proposition," suggesting that rules
should be determined after goals and with reference to them.
In the last paragraph of his paper, Dean McKay refers to "a
forward-looking partnership between students and universities
in the educational process." 8 This implies an approach to
student-institutional relationships to which I will return.
(4) Robert Lutz advised us that the legal approach will
not eliminate the problems that confront us; that the real problem is the relationship question itself, independent of the legal
aspects; and that that relationship, in his judgment, can no
longer be based on an apprenticeship model - at least of the
old style.4
Professor Monypenny's paper also triggered the preceeding
comments. In fact, as the anchor man on this relay team let me pick
up the baton where he passed it in his concluding remarks.
As an educator rather than a legal expert, it seems to me that
educational communities - however difficult to define - rather
than the courts should continue to shape the style, content, and diversity of higher education. I agree most enthusiastically with Professor Monypenny that:
[i]t is to questions of just principle rather than to questions of the
permissible legal limits of authority that the attention of those who
govern institutions should be turned. .

.

. If the agencies of edu-

cation act justly, and seem to act justly, the courts will find very few
occasions to impose a judicially developed view of justice on them.5
Further, let me agree with his expectation of what I consider a dire
possibility that:
if the courts take on too many institutional decisions because they
appear to be bad, they may develop confidence in their own expertise
and routinely set aside decisions in apparently technical fields.6
I Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 514 (1968).
2 Schwartz, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 525, 526 (1968).
3 McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 570 (1968).
4See Lutz, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 574 (1968).
5 Monypenny, The Student as a Student, 45 DENVER I.J. 649, 658 (1968).
6 Id.at 654.
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At one point, however, in his description of Goldman's four
approaches to the limitation of discretion, Professor Monypenny
indicates that the contract doctrine is "cherished" by administrators.
I suspect he knows my views on this point, but it may be in order to
suggest that there are administrators who have abandoned that
stance, at least in disciplinary proceedings, with somewhat the same
degree of enthusiasm that marked the unlamented passing of the
in loco parentis doctrine. The reason for rejection in both instances,
it seems to me, was in part an emerging perception by student personnel administrators that their role in the university community was
broader than a housekeeping-management one, and, in fact, involved
an educational dimension. Under such a philosophy, the "contract"
doctrine is at least unnecessary and probably irrelevant.
Let me add a fifth perception of the relationship of the university to its students which, I think, is more distinctively a concept
drawn from the academic rather than the legal community. Dr. Peter
Armacost, President of Ottawa University, former Program Director
of the Association of American Colleges, and a member with me of
the final drafting committee on the Joint Statement on Rights
and Freedoms of Students, suggests in an unpublished paper that
"the most desirable formulation of the student-college relationship
is that of the student as a junior colleague in a community of
scholars." I believe that Professor Monypenny on a previous occasion may have also addressed himself to such a concept of studentinstitution relationship.
Because students are likely to have an unnecessary affective
hang-up with the "junior" adjective, and because it seems to me that
the "junior" is excess baggage (if merit and competence will, in any
event, decide the "junior-senior" distinction), my own preference is
to consider the relationship simply in the "colleague" context. Let
me explicitly add, however, that this is not to suggest an "equality"
among colleagues - any more than there is an equality among those
attending this conference or among colleagues on our several
campuses. It is intended, however, as a suggestion that we consider
extending the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of that relationship to students.
As Armacost points out in some detail in his paper, there are,
quite obviously, important implications of such a proposal. From
my point of view and biases, the first and most critical of these is
the resulting definition that the relationship between a college or
university and its students is primarily an educational one. The pursuit of shared educational objectives becomes the basis for association
with an academic community. And, because students are likely to
respond more positively to the colleague role than to that of a "foster
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child," for example, this approach to student-college relationships
may be substantially more conducive to the development of that
elusive ideal- an "academic community."
Second, the "colleague" approach is undergirded by a sense of
mutual respect which is a normal affective stance toward others involved in such a relationship. To paraphrase Professor Beaney on
this point, this would be the climate or relationship resulting from
the efforts of reasonable men to treat other reasonable men in a
just manner.
Third, real criteria - differences in experience and abilityrather than artificial assumptions of immaturity and irresponsibility
become the yardstick for evaluations that credit or discredit the contribution of the individual student as he participates as a colleague
in the institution's decisionmaking process.
Fourth, implementation of the colleague approach in the policy
making area results in all issues affecting the community being the
concern of all members of that community. It results, too, in the
development of a process to effectively involve them in any issue in
which they have a stake. It becomes just as important, for example,
for faculty colleagues to participate in discussions about student
social life as for students to be involved in curricular matters.
Fifth, if students are in fact to be colleagues, then rules and
regulations defining expectations of student conduct need to be reexamined. Consideration might even be given to the establishment
of standards applicable to all members of the community. Whatever
the outcome, however, such reexamination should begin with a clear
definition of institutional goals, and the resulting regulations should
be required to pass the test of being both reasonable and relevant
in terms of those goals.
Let me conclude this response to the topic "The Student as a Student," now amended to "The Student as a Colleague," by suggesting
that our choice appears to be whether we develop a "colleague"
status and relationship with judges and courts in the shaping of the
destiny of higher education, or whether we relate to students in that
status in real, not artificial, terms. My experience with students has
taught me that ultimately you cannot fool them and ultimately you
can trust them. Because students are where the action is, and because
they have a personal stake in higher education not dissimilar to my
own, let me cast a vote for students as colleagues.

